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SHOULD NON-EURO AREA COUNTRIES JOIN THE SINGLE
SUPERVISORY MECHANISM?1
Zsolt Darvas2 & Guntram B.Wolff3
Abstract
Irrespective of the euro crisis, a European banking union makes sense, including for
non-euro area countries, because of the extent of European Union financial integration.
The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) is the first element of the banking union.
From the point of view of non-euro countries, the draft SSM regulation as amended by
the EU Council includes strong safeguards relating to decision-making, accountability,
attention to financial stability in small countries and the applicability of national macro-
prudential measures. Non-euro countries will also have the right to leave the SSM and
thereby exempt themselves from a supervisory decision. The SSM by itself cannot bring
the full benefits of the banking union, but would foster financial integration, improve the
supervision of cross-border banks, ensure greater consistency of supervisory practices,
increase the quality of supervision, avoid competitive distortions and provide ample su-
pervisory information. While the decision to join the SSM is made difficult by uncertainty
surrounding other elements of the banking union, including possible burden sharing, we
conclude that non-euro EU members should stand ready to join the SSM and be prepared
for negotiations on the other elements of the banking union.
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I. Introduction
Following the euro-area summit of 29 June, 2012, at which European Union leaders
endorsed common supervisory oversight of banks, Europe is determined to move ahead
1 This paper was prepared for a hearing on The economic crisis and the development of the European Union
at the Danish Parliament on 26 February 2013. The authors are grateful to colleagues both inside and outside
Bruegel for comments and to Carlos de Sousa and Giuseppe Daluiso for excellent research assistance.
2 Bruegel, Rue de la Charite´ 33, 1210 Brussels, Belgium; Corvinus University Budapest and Research Centre
for Economic and Regional Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. E-mail: zsolt.darvas@bruegel.org.
3 Bruegel, Rue de la Charite´ 33, 1210 Brussels, Belgium. E-mail: guntram.wolff@bruegel.org.
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with a banking union. The decision stemmed partly from the recognition of the discrepancy
between the integrated European banking market and largely national banking policies.
But perhaps even more importantly, the decision was a response to increasing market
pressure on several interlinked euro-area banks and sovereigns, and increasing financial
fragmentation, which entailed a risk of major negative impacts on the economy of the
euro-area and beyond. It is worth repeating the first sentence of the statements from
the euro-area summit of 29 June, 2012: “We affirm that it is imperative to break the
vicious circle between banks and sovereigns”4. The vicious circle has been highlighted by
different researchers (e.g. Gerlach, Schulz and Wolff, 2010; Ve´ron, 2011; Darvas, 2011;
Merler and Pisani-Ferry, 2012; Angeloni and Wolff, 2012). The European banking union
initiative aims to address this vicious circle, to improve the quality of banking oversight
and thereby to reduce the probability of bank failures and their cost to taxpayers.
The following elements are generally seen as central to completing the banking union:
common banking supervision based on a single rulebook, a single resolution mechanism,
agreement on fiscal burden sharing and some degree of common deposit insurance (Pisani-
Ferry et al, 2012). Better banking oversight would reduce the likelihood of bank failures
and their cost to taxpayers while resolution equally aims to reduce costs for the taxpayer.
Fiscal burden sharing is the logical complement in order to escape the vicious circle. Most
of the discussion in the second half of 2012 focused on the supervisorymechanism, leading
to Council agreement on the legislative proposal for the Single Supervisory Mechanism
(SSM) on 12 December, 2012, (see Council, 2012, hereafter ‘draft regulation’) and an
accompanying agreement on modifying the regulation of the European Banking Authority
(EBA). With regard to the single resolution mechanism, including its fiscal backstop, the
European Commission has announced its intention to publish the first proposals before
summer 2013 (see Ve´ron and Wolff, 2013, for more details). The most contentious part
of the discussion certainly relates to the fiscal burden-sharing arrangements (Pisani-Ferry
and Wolff, 2012).
The final design of the future banking union is still unclear. While euro-area members will
be included in all elements of the banking union, the December 2012 agreement allows
non-euro area EU members to participate in the SSM. Presumably, further elements of
the banking union will also allow the participation of non-euro area members in certain
forms5. For these countries, therefore, an important strategic question is if and when to join
part or all of the emerging banking union. Once the SSM comes into being, these non-euro
countries will have to decide whether or not to participate in it, without knowing the design
of the other elements of the banking union. While the SSM is just a part of the banking
union and cannot deliver the full benefits, it offers a number of benefits. In particular, the
supervision of cross-border banks should be improved and supervisory practices should
be made more consistent, thereby fostering financial integration with associated benefits.
4 See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/131359.pdf.
5 So far only the United Kingdom has expressed very clearly the intention to stay out of the European banking
union.
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The initial proposal for the SSM of the European Commission6 on 12 September 2012 was
perceived by many non-euro area countries as not catering sufficiently for their interests.
The core difficulty relates to the defined treaty base and the resulting decision-making
structure. In line with the June 2012 European Council conclusions, the Commission’s
September 2012 proposal for a regulation (COM (2012) 511) employs as a treaty base
Article 127(6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU). This article puts the
EuropeanCentral Bank at the centre of themechanism. The ultimate decision-making body
of the ECB is its Governing Council (Art. 129(1), TFEU), in which non-euro area countries
do not have a vote. The use of this treaty base was seen by many non-euro area countries
as essentially preventing them from participating in the mechanism7. In the subsequent
negotiations, significant modifications were made, partly with the aim of addressing the
concerns of non-euro area members. The significance of the changes is also highlighted
by a change in the vocabulary. Article 2(1) of the Commission’s September 2012 proposal
put forward the following definition: “‘participating Member State’ means a Member
State whose currency is the euro”, while the December 2012 draft regulation changed
this definition to “‘participating Member State’ means a Member State whose currency is
the euro or a Member State whose currency is not the euro which has established a close
cooperation in accordance with Article 6”8.
The European Parliament reached a deal with the Council in March 2013 and, at the time
of writing, final negotiations are ongoing. The enactment of the draft regulation is expected
during the summer of 2013 and the single supervisor is expected to start operating in the
summer of 2014.
In this article we assess the December 2012 draft regulation (Council, 2012) from the
perspective of EU states outside the euro area, and we evaluate arguments against, and
in favour of, joining the SSM. The next section analyses the legal text, while section 3
discusses the arguments for and against. The last section concludes.
II. The draft SSM regulation: key aspects for non-euro area countries
In this section, we briefly discuss some of the key aspects of the December 2012 draft
SSM regulation which are most relevant to non-euro area participating member states. We
also review the safeguards for non-participating EU member states.
6 COM (2012) 511. See http://ec.europa.eu/internal market/finances/banking-union/index en.htm, and an as-
sessment of the Commission’s proposals in Ve´ron (2012).
7 The alternative treaty base, Article 352, was not pursued and the Council had to find a compromise solution
based on Article 127(6) which refers to the ECB. Article 127(6) says the following: “The Council, acting by
means of regulations in accordance with a special legislative procedure, may unanimously, and after consulting
the European Parliament and the European Central Bank, confer specific tasks upon the European Central Bank
concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and other financial institutions
with the exception of insurance undertakings.”
8 Similarly, the title of Article 6 dealing with non-euro countries was changed from “close cooperation with the
competent authorities of non participating Member States” in the September 2012 proposal of the Commission
to “close cooperation with the competent authorities of participating Member States whose currency is not the
euro” in the December 2012 draft regulation.
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Legal framework
Article 6 of the draft regulation defines the terms of cooperation of participating member
states that have a currency other than the euro. The SSM is open to non-euro EU countries
on the basis of “close cooperation”. Close cooperation essentially requires non-euro
member states that wish to join the SSM to adopt the necessary legal framework and
cooperate with the ECB along the lines codified in the draft regulation. This means, in
particular, that the national authorities, like those authorities within the euro area, will be
bound to abide by guidelines and requests issued by the ECB and will be responsible for
providing adequate information.
Right to exit
The draft regulation’s Article 6 allows for the exit of non-euro area participating member
states in three scenarios: 1) after three years without qualification (Article 6(6a)); 2)
exclusion by the ECB in the event of major non-compliance by the authorities of the
non-euro area country (Article 6(6)); and 3) expedited exit procedure at the request of the
non-euro area country in the event of a major disagreement with a supervisory decision
impacting the country (Article 6(6aab)). Following an exit, re-entering the SSM is possible
only after three years.
Decision making
SSM draft decisions will be taken by a supervisory board created by the draft regulation.
Draft decisions will be deemed adopted unless the ECB Governing Council objects within
a period to be defined but less than 10 days (Article 19(3)). The supervisory board will
consist of the chair, the vice chair (an ECB executive board member), four representatives
from the ECB and one representative from the supervisory authority of each member state
participating in the SSM9. Decisions of the supervisory board shall be taken by simple
majority of its members, with every member having one vote (Article 19(2ab)), except
for decisions on regulations adopted by the ECB (Article 4(3)).
This compromise considerably increases the influence of non-euro area countries over
supervisory decisions, probably to the maximum that is possible under the adopted legal
framework. Nevertheless, additional safeguards are provided for non-euro area countries.
First, draft decisions of the supervisory board are transmitted to the member states con-
cerned at the same time as they are transmitted to the ECB Governing Council. Whenever
a non-euro area participating member state objects to a draft decision prepared by the
supervisory board, the Governing Council will invite the representatives of that member
state to the meeting. Appeal to the EU Court of Justice is possible. There is also the
procedure (discussed above) allowing for the expedited exit of the member state (Article
6(6aab)), in which case the decision of the Governing Council will not apply to that
member state.
9 When the national supervisor is not the central bank, then a representative of the central bank can also participate
in the supervisory board. However, when it comes to voting, they will have only one vote (Article 19(1)).
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Accountability
The accountability of the ECB in the exercise of its supervisory tasks is broad-based.
The ECB would be accountable to the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers
for the implementation of the draft regulation (Article 17). There are regular reporting
requirements and the supervisory board chair needs to present the report to the European
Parliament and the Eurogroup extended by those ministers of countries participating in
the SSM. The chair may also be heard by the relevant committees on the execution of
its tasks. Finally, the ECB is also required to answer in writing any questions raised by
national parliaments, and national parliaments may invite the chair or any other member
of the supervisory board for an exchange of views (Article 17aa). Overall, in terms of
accountability, the draft regulation therefore puts non-euro area countries on equal terms
with euro-area countries.
Supervisory convergence
One pre-requisite for the establishment of the SSM is the passing of the Capital Require-
ments Regulation (CRR) and the complementary fourth Capital Requirements Directive
(CRD4). This is necessary so that the SSM can implement a harmonised supervisory
rulebook based on the Basel III accord instead of the different national regulations that
are currently in place. To ensure consistency of standards throughout the EU, the draft
regulation foresees that the European Banking Authority continues to ensure supervisory
convergence and consistency of supervisory outcomes. From the point of view of the
rules determining banking supervision, there should be no material difference between
countries in the SSM and those outside the SSM. Whether in practice there will be diffe-
rences remains to be seen. It appears, however, possible that the ECBwill de facto become
a standard setter in supervisory practices and most member states would eventually have
to apply those standards.
Coverage
As a general rule, only ‘significant’ financial institutions (and their subsidiaries and bran-
ches) will be directly supervised by the ECB, but the ECB will have the right to supervise
any institution, if an institution is suspected of causing a significant risk to financial sta-
bility. We aim to quantify the share in total assets under direct ECB supervision in each
non-euro country if it were to join the SSM (see details in the appendix). Our results
(Figure 1, left column for each country) indicate that, for most non-euro area countries,
participation would lead to a large share of their assets being covered, but a relatively low
numbers of banks (de Sousa and Wolff (2012) document a similar result for euro-area
countries). For countries outside the SSM, only branches of large banks that are headquar-
tered in a participating member state will fall under ECB supervision, while subsidiaries
remain under the supervision of national supervisors.
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Figure 1: Percent of assets falling under the SSM in case of participation and percent of assets
of EU banks’ subsidiaries
Sources: The Banker Database, ECB and Bruegel calculation
Note: The left column for each country shows the coverage of the SSM in case of participation of all
EU countries, while the right column shows the share of subsidiaries of parent banks headquartered
in EU countries. See Appendix 1 for details. Numbers over the bars give the number of banks.
In central and eastern Europe, where the banking systems are dominated by subsidiaries
and branches of euro-area parent banks (right column of Figure 1), coverage by the SSM
would mainly relate to these subsidiaries and criteria concerning the three biggest banks
(see Appendix for details of criteria). In contrast, in the United Kingdom, Denmark and
Sweden, the role of subsidiaries of foreign banks is minor.
Another interesting aspect in terms of coverage is the case of subsidiaries in participating
member states of those banking groups that are headquartered in a non-euro area member
state. For example, in tables 1–3 we look at the geographical composition of the assets of
Danske Group and the Hungarian OTP Group. Danske mostly operates branches in other
countries, but it has a major subsidiary in Finland, which will be covered by the SSM
irrespective of Denmark’s participation in the SSM, because it belongs to one of the three
largest Finnish banks. Danish participation in the SSM would bring most of the group’s
activities under the umbrella of the ECB, including the branch in Norway. OTP Group, on
the other hand, does not have a major subsidiary in any euro-area country. But OTP has
several subsidiaries outside the EU and therefore, should Hungary participate in the SSM,
then at least one-fifth of the total activities of the OTP Group will not be supervised by
the ECB, while another fifth will depend on the SSM participation of Bulgaria, Croatia
and Romania.
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Table 1: Composition of the consolidated balance sheet of Danske Group, end of 2012
e billions Share
Due from credit institutions and central banks 15.2 3%
Repo loans 41.2 9%
Loans and advances 224.4 48%
Trading portfolio assets 108.9 23%
Investment securities 14.4 3%
Assets under insurance contracts 32.3 7%
Other assets 30.6 7%
Total assets 467.1 100%
Source: Dankse Bank (2013)
Table 2: Geographical distribution of banking activities of the Danske Group, end of 2012
e billions Share Share in Total Assets
Retail Banking Denmark 127.8 57% 27%
Retail Banking Sweden (branch) 24.7 11% 5%
Retail Banking Finland (subsidiary) 20.4 9% 4%
Retail Banking Norway (branch) 19.0 8% 4%
Retail Banking Ireland (branch) 13.3 6% 3%
Banking Activities Baltics (branches) 2.5 1% 1%
Other Banking Activities 2.3 1% 1%
Corporate & Institutional Banking 13.4 6% 3%
Total Banking Activities 223.2 100% 48%
Source: Danske Bank (2013)
Table 3: Distribution of the consolidated balance sheet of the OTP Group among countries of
operations, 2012Q3
e billion Share
(a) Hungary 21.3 57%
(b) Euro-area countries 1.3 4%
Slovakia 1.3 4%
(c) Other EU countries 8.0 21%
Bulgaria 4.6 12%
Croatia 1.8 5%
Romania 1.6 4%
(d) Non-EU countries 6.8 18%
Montenegro 0.8 2%
Serbia 0.4 1%
Russia 3.4 9%
Ukraine 2.3 6%
Consolidated 37.5 100%
Source: OTP Bank Plc (2012)
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Table 2 shows a breakdown of the lending activities of Danske Bank, although unfortu-
nately, a breakdown of all its activities in the countries where it operates is not available.
Lending accounts for 48 percent of its total assets (Table 1). If Denmark were to remain
outside the SSM, then Danske’s subsidiary in Finland would be directly supervised by
the ECB, because it is one of the three biggest banks in Finland. Apart from two small
subsidiaries, one in Luxembourg and one in Northern Ireland (not separated in Table 2),
in other euro-area countries and in the Baltic states, Danske operates branches, implying
that these branches would fall under ECB supervision only if Denmark were to join the
SSM.
OTP’s subsidiary in Slovakia, a euro-area country, is small and therefore it will not be
covered by the SSM if Hungary stays out (Table 3). But if Hungary were to join the SSM,
61 percent of OTP’s activities would certainly be covered, about one-fifth of the group’s
total activity would be outside the jurisdiction of the SSM (activities in non-EU countries)
and another one-fifth might or might not be covered, depending on Bulgaria’s, Croatia’s
and Romania’s participation in the SSM.
Non-participating member states
The draft regulation foresees that countries outside the SSM would conclude a Memoran-
dum of Understanding describing how they will cooperate with the ECB (Article 3(4a)).
This would involve regular consultations and agreement on how to manage emergency
situations. The draft SSM regulation was accompanied by a regulation on changes to the
EBA. Under this regulation, decisions require a double majority (a majority of both SSM
participating member states and of non-participating member states), strongly improving
the position of non-participating member states in EBA decisions10.
III. Pros and cons of joining the SSM
A number of arguments need to be carefully weighed when considering whether or not to
join the SSM.
First, we consider the main concerns11 about the European Commission’s September 2012
proposal, and assess the extent to which the December 2012 draft regulation addresses
these issues. Here, we do not discuss the multiple questions related to the single bank
resolution mechanism, the shape of which still remains largely unexplored.
10 Also, the preamble to the draft regulation states that: “EBA is entrusted with developing draft technical
standards and guidelines and recommendations ensuring supervisory convergence and consistency of supervisory
outcomes within the Union. The ECB should not replace the exercise of these tasks by the EBA”, but to adopt
regulations based on the guidelines and recommendations of the EBA.
11 The source of some of these earlier worries is Zettelmeyer, Berglo¨f and de Haas (2012), while others emerged
during our interviews with various stakeholders.
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Inadequate inclusion of non-euro participating member states
in decision making
It was feared that the SSM would only cater for the interests of euro-area countries, while
countries outside the euro area would either not be able to participate in the system,
or if they would, they would not have a sufficient voice in the decisions. The Treaty’s
Article 127(6) provides a relatively weak basis for the involvement of non-euro area
member states, as the article puts the ECB at the centre of decision making. Indeed,
the final decision-making body of the ECB is the Governing Council, consisting of the
ECB executive board and the central bank governors of those countries with the euro.
As a consequence, final supervisory decisions will have to be passed by the Governing
Council. As argued previously, within these limits, the draft regulation has arguably
achieved the maximum possible decision-making power and involvement for non-euro
area members.
Also, whenever a non-euro area participating member state disagrees with a draft proposal
of the supervisory board and this proposal is passed by the Governing Council, or when
such a member state agrees with the draft proposal, but that proposal is overturned by the
Governing Council12, then the special opt-out clause for non-euro participating member
states can apply, so that the member state is not bound by the decision. This is, of course,
a radical decision and the draft regulation therefore foresees that, in such a situation, it
is impossible to re-enter the SSM within three years. The opt-out clause caters for such
concerns but comes at a significant price. In particular, it introduces significant uncertainty
about the permanence of the geographical coverage of the SSM13.
Furthermore, the preamble to the draft regulation keeps the option open to adjust the
treaty base of the SSM in order to enshrine the full participation of non-euro area coun-
tries14. Overall, we would argue that non-euro area participating member states will have
a sufficient voice in decision making in the steady state.
Inattention to small countries
Some feared that the ECB might devote insufficient attention to the supervision of a small
country’s financial system. However, this is not a concern that is in anyway specific to non-
euro area countries. Moreover, the draft regulation defines the clear goal of safeguarding
12 It is, however, quite unlikely that the majority on any major supervisory decision will be so thin in the
supervisory board that there would be a different majority in the Governing Council.
13 This option provides non-euro area countries with a very special status in which purely national interests can,
under certain conditions, be put ahead of the common interest.
14 Wolff (2012) called for a sunset clause in the regulation to force the reconsideration of the treaty base. The
draft regulation’s preamble now reiterates the Commission proposal (which was put forward in its Blueprint for
a deep and genuine economic and monetary union) to amend Article 127(6) of the TFU to eliminate some legal
constraints, such as “to enshrine a direct and irrevocable opt-in by non-euro area Member States to the SSM,
beyond the model of ”close cooperation”, grant non-euro area Member States participating in the SSM fully
equal rights in the ECB’s decision-making, and go even further in the internal separation of decision making
on monetary policy and on supervision.” A reconsideration of the legal framework is thus not fully off the
table and even German finance minister Wolfgang Scha¨uble argued that treaty change is needed for a proper
resolution framework and that treaty change should also put non-euro area members on an equal footing in the
SSM (Scha¨uble, 2013).
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financial stability both at EU level and in each participating member state. The ECB will
supervise credit institutions on a consolidated basis with regard to the group, but also
on an individual basis with regard to subsidiaries and branches in participating member
states. While the primary focus of the SSM will be large banks, whenever there is a risk
that a small bank poses a threat to financial stability, the ECB can apply supervision to
this credit institution, even if it is a branch of a parent bank outside the SSM. We do not
therefore see a risk that the ECB will overlook important supervisory matters in countries
with few and small banks.
Macroprudential tools
Some non-euro area member states were concerned that the centralisation of macro-
prudential tools at the ECB would prevent them from taking appropriate macroprudential
regulatory action in response to issues specific to countries outside the euro, especiallywith
regard to capital buffers. This has been revised very significantly by the draft regulation,
even though the application of Article 4a (‘Macroprudential tasks and tools’) to non-euro
participating member states is unclear, because Article 6 only entitles the ECB to carry
out tasks referred to in articles 4(1) and (2) in participating member states whose currency
is not the euro and Article 4a is a different article.
Article 4a of the draft regulation grants wide-ranging rights to adopt national macro-
prudential regulations at national level. While the ECB can express objections to the
proposed measures, the concerned national authority only has to “duly consider the ECB’s
reasons prior to proceeding with the decision” (Article 4a(1)), but the ECB cannot block
such measures. On the other hand, the ECB can apply higher requirements for capital
buffers and more stringent measures aimed at addressing systemic or macroprudential
risks.
Granting the right to the ECB to apply stricter macroprudential measures in euro-area
participating member states, but not in non-euro area participating member states, would
be counter-intuitive and therefore we assume that this has to be a mistake in the draft
regulation which will be corrected. But in any case, national authorities will have wide-
ranging rights to apply macroprudential tools at their own discretion.
Supervisory coordination failures with respect to banks
with cross-border activities
As argued by Zettelmeyer, Berglo¨f and De Haas (2012), a major drawback of the Commis-
sion’s September 2012 proposal was not addressing the supervisory coordinator failures
with respect to multinational banks, for which either the parent or the subsidiary is located
outside the SSM countries. These failures arise from direct conflict of interest over how to
share the burden of bank resolution, and the anticipation of such a situation during good
times. The main concern of national authorities is the eventual burden on their domes-
tic taxpayers, and they pay much less attention to the cross-border externalities of their
actions.
Despite the establishment of the EBA, which aims to coordinate between home and host
supervisors in the EU, several unilateral actions were adopted by national supervisors
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to ring-fence banking activities. Recently, the European Commission even had to issue
a statement on 4 February, 2013, trying to limit such activities, including intra-EU capital
controls and other restrictions15. While Article 1 of the draft regulation states the impor-
tance of the unity and integrity of the singlemarket, there is notmuch in the draft regulation
that could help to resolve such cross-border supervisory conflicts between SSM countries
and those outside. One of the core points of contention will be about the eventual burden
sharing – something on which this draft regulation has little to say. However, since most
banks and subsidiaries established in non-euro countries are headquartered in euro-area
member states (Figure 1), if non-euro countries join the SSM, this problem would have
less relevance thereafter, because the ECB will be the supervisor of both the parents and
the subsidiaries in participating member states.
Still, as discussed, national supervisory authorities in the SSM could apply various ma-
croprudential measures that may also serve ring-fencing, and the ECB will not be able to
block such measures.
But arguably, addressing cross-border supervisory coordination issues would be easier if
both the parent and the subsidiary belong to the SSM. This suggests that those non-euro
area member states in which subsidiaries of parent banks from SSM participant countries
have a significant role, i.e. CEE EU members, should enter the SSM.
Similarly, since Swedish banks have significant activities in the Baltic countries and
Estonia is a member of the euro area and Latvia may join the euro area in 2014, these
two countries will likely be included in the SSM. We cannot rule out the possibility
that Lithuania will also join the SSM16. Therefore, the suspected improvement in the
supervision of cross-border banking groups by the SSM would benefit Sweden as well.
Beyond these earlier concerns, a number of additional factors have to be considered.
Effect on cross-border financial integration
with non-participating countries
Some observers argue that large banking groups headquartered in euro-area countries may
re-consider the geographical scope of their business and may reduce their cross-border
banking activities with non-SSM countries. In particular, they may reduce the activities
of their subsidiaries and branches established in countries that do not participate in the
SSM. This may in particular be a concern if one sees the decision to join the SSM as
a clear decision to also join the forthcoming Single Resolution Mechanism. If that was to
15 While we could not find an official release, several news sites reported this statement, see e.g. Bloomberg
(2013a), Reuters (2013) and Emerging Markets (2013). The statement said: “The Commission took this action
because it had been made aware that, on several occasions, national bank supervisors acted independently to
impose allegedly disproportionate prudential measures on national banking subsidiaries of cross-border EU
banking groups. The alleged measures in question include capital controls, restrictions on intra-group transfers
and lending, limiting activities of branches or prohibiting expatriation of profits. These would have the effect of
‘ring-fencing’ assets, which could, in practice, restrict cross-border transfers of banks’ capital and potentially
constrain the free flow of capital throughout the EU.”
16 In Lithuania, the institutions that could fall under the SSM are: Swedbank (Swedish), SEB Group (Swedish)
and Snoras Bank (third largest Lithuanian bank), because these are the three largest banks, plus Danske Bank
(if Denmark joins). In Latvia, Swedbank, SEB Group and Aizkraukles Banka (third biggest Latvian bank), plus
Latvijas Krajbanka and Sampo Banka (if Lithuania and Denmark join, respectively) would be included.
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happen, it may generate economic costs for these countries and it may prove to be difficult
to re-establish the currently strong cross-border financial integration, once a country has
joined the SSM later.
A number of arguments need to be considered carefully in this regard. First, delaying
a decision on joining the SSM increases uncertainty for the banks concerned. Banks do
not know whether they will eventually fall under the joint supervision, whether they will
be supervised as a group or whether subsidiaries will remain under national supervision
only. This represents an important uncertainty which will justify delaying decisions on
bank operations as well as investments. When bank regulation and the scrutiny of bank su-
pervision is very different under the SSM than under national supervision, this uncertainty
is compounded.
But more importantly, some of the cross-border banks are already now affected by regu-
latory practices relating to cross-border liquidity and capital operations. Indeed, a number
of home supervisors tried to ring-fence banking activities inside the home country during
the crisis, as we discussed in the previous sub-section. Even though one of the goals of
the draft regulation is to preserve the integrity of the single market, this risk will remain,
and in particular, the home supervisor of the parent bank may discriminate against non-
participating member states. It remains to be seen to what extent the ECB will be able and
willing to challenge the currently reported ring-fencing of banking activities.
At the same time, there are also factors suggesting that participation in the SSM, or the lack
of it, may not be a key factor influencing the cross-border investment decisions of major
banking groups. Banking groupsmade strategic decisions to engage in activities outside the
country of their headquarters. In non-euro areamember states in central and eastern Europe
(CEE), banking was much more profitable than in EU15 countries before the crisis (Figure
2; starting point of the arrows)17. While CEE economic growth rates will likely be smaller
compared to pre-crisis growth rates, and economic growth is not the only determinant
of bank profitability, these countries continue to have a brighter economic outlook than
euro-area countries, according to medium-term forecasts18. Therefore, banking in these
countries will likely remain more profitable than banking in euro-area countries. Clearly,
major euro-area banking groups have started to reduce their exposure to the region, but
most likely because either their exposure has grown too high or because they faced
serious capital and liquidity needs in their home countries or regulatory pressure with
similar effects. These latter considerations may remain and therefore their exposure to the
region may be reduced further.
Figure 2 shows that the exposure of international banks to the CEE countries generally
declined during the crisis while profitability also declined. The exposures of foreign banks
17 During the crisis, return on equity was highly negative in the three Baltic counties that went through un-
sustainable credit booms before the crisis and an extreme bust and economic hardship during the crisis. Bank
profitability also turned negative in Hungary by 2011 due to unusually high bank taxes and other measures.
18 Bank profitability depends on many factors, such as the composition and the risk profile of assets, competition,
bank taxes, etc. But faster economic growth helps bank profitability by reducing the share of non-performing
loans and by offering more scope for expansion of banking activities. The simple correlation coefficient between
pre-crisis GDP growth and return on equity is 0.50 during 2003–2007 and 0.62 during 2008–2011 for 26 EU
countries (current EU27 minus Cyprus and Malta due to lack of data, plus Croatia).
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to Denmark and Sweden have not declined from 2008Q3 to 2012Q3. The change in ex-
posure to CEE countries from 2008Q3 to 2011Q3 was greater when (a) the exposure was
greater in 2008Q3 and (b) bank profitability declined significantly from 2008–2011. Fo-
reign banks may be more selective in cross-border investments, but we see little incentive
to reduce the exposure to, e.g. the Czech Republic and Poland, two countries in which the
banking business remained highly profitable during the crisis and the exposure of foreign
banks is not too high. In Denmark and Sweden, banking also generated sizeable returns:
better than in all other EU15 countries indicated on the right panel of Figure 2.
Also, supervisory differences might not be a major concern. Major banking groups have
developed their CEE subsidiaries under the supervision of national authorities and hence
the absence of change in the supervisor should not immediately imply a change in their
strategic engagements. It can be assumed that the headquarters anyway have strong cont-
rols over their subsidiaries. Too-stringent nationalmacro-prudential tools limiting business
opportunities may be implemented under the SSM as well as outside of it.
Figure 2: Return on equity of banks and the change in foreign banks’ exposure to the domestic
economy from 2008Q3 to 2012Q3
Central and eastern Europe EU members before 2004
Source: Bruegel calculations using IMF Financial Soundness Indicator tables and BIS data
Note: the starting coordinate of an arrow is the exposure of BIS reporting banks (i.e. all banks in
the world, not just euro-area banks) in 2008Q3 as a percentage of 2008 GDP of the host country on
the horizontal axis and the average return on equity during 2003–2007 on the vertical axis. The end
coordinate of an arrow is the exposure in 2012Q3 on the horizontal axis and the average return on
equity during 2008–2011 on the vertical axis. The 2012Q3 exposure is expressed again as a percen-
tage of 2008 GDP, in order not to confuse changes in the exposure with changes in GDP, and the
2012Q3 exposure was calculated on an exchange rate-adjusted basis so that exchange rate changes
do not influence the reported magnitude of the change in exposure. Data for six EU countries are
not reported due to very high values. In these countries, the exposure declined from 2008Q3 to
2011Q3: in Cyprus from 271 percent to 242 percent; in Ireland from 486 percent to 299 percent;
in Luxembourg from 1,778 percent to 1,748 percent; in Malta from 546 percent to 450 percent; in
the Netherlands from 177 percent to 143 percent; and in the United Kingdom from 202 percent to
179 percent (all are expressed as a% of 2008GDP and are based on exchange-rate adjusted changes).
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Overall, the immediate risk related to reducing the activities of subsidiaries of major
banking groups established in non-participating countries may not be very high, but
uncertainty, including about discriminatory measures against non-participating member
states by the home supervisor of the parent bank, could limit the activities of large financial
groups in non-participating member states (and also in non-EU countries).
Competitive disadvantage of banks not owned by a parent bank headquartered
in an SSM country
When a country remains outside the SSM, then domestically-owned banks and those banks
that do not have a parent bank in an SSMparticipatingmember statemay face a competitive
disadvantage. If supervision by the ECB is regarded as an important safeguard in the
assessment of the soundness of banks, then staying out may imply higher financing costs:
the cost of wholesale funding may be relatively higher and the depositors may also require
a higher interest rate. While it is difficult to assess the risk and the magnitude of such
competitive disadvantages, they call for membership of the SSM.
Implicit obligation to join other elements of the banking union
after SSM membership
Clearly, there is uncertainty about the next steps for the banking union, and belonging
to the SSM may imply an obligation to join other elements of the banking union when
they are adopted. More specifically, Point 11 of the 14 December 2012 European Council
conclusions foresees that the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) will apply to member
states participating in the SSM(seeEuropeanCouncil, 2012).However, the draft regulation
itself does not include a legal obligation for SSM members to join the SRM when it is
enacted and therefore, in principle, a non-euro area SSM participating member may decide
to opt out of the SRM.
The experience with the negotiations for the SSM showed that the interests of non-euro
area member states were considered to perhaps the greatest possible extent allowed by the
TFEU. As in the case of the SSM, the next step in the banking union, the SRM, will be
agreed on by the co-legislators, to which the non-euro members are a full party. We do
not see how non-euro countries would have a smaller impact on policy choices than euro-
area members. At the same time, non-euro area countries are not included in important
debates, in particular those relating to the European StabilityMechanism (ESM). But SSM
membership would not make a material difference in these debates.
On the whole, we do not believe that any automaticity in joining further elements of the
banking union should be assumed and this should not be a central argument for not joining
the SSM.
Contribution to the shaping of the practical operation of the SSM
The ECB Governing Council and the supervisory board will have to set the rules for the
practical operation of the SSM. This will be done at an early stage and will likely shape
the effectiveness and inclusiveness of the new mechanism in a fundamental way. While
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according to the draft regulation, non-euro member states will be members only if this
decision is published in the Official Journal of the European Union (Article 6(4) of the
draft regulation) and therefore most likely they can join formally only after the system
has been set up, a clear and early signal to join the SSM is likely to increase the voice of
non-euro member states in shaping the modalities. This argument therefore calls for an
early indication of the intention to join, even though the modalities must be in line with
the draft technical standards and guidelines and recommendations prepared by the EBA.
Access to supervisory information
Non-participating EU member states will sign a memorandum of understanding with the
ECB on cooperation during good times (i.e. consultations relating to decisions of the
ECB having effect on subsidiaries and branches established in the member state) and
cooperation in emergency situations. This may improve the flow of information related to
supervisory matters from the SSM towards non-participating countries, but undoubtedly,
participating member states will have full access to supervisory information. This would
be especially valuable for countries in which several subsidiaries and branches of euro-
area banking groups are established, i.e. the CEE members of the EU. But the authorities
of other countries, such as Denmark and Sweden, would also benefit from the access to
supervisory information concerning financial institutions covered by the SSM. Therefore,
access to supervisory information weighs positively on the decision to join the SSM.
IV. Conclusion
The European banking union project makes sense irrespective of the euro crisis. It also
makes sense for non-euro area countries. In a financially-integrated area, like the European
Union, differences in national banking policies can tilt the playing field and lead to sub-
optimal banking and supervisory decisions. The pre-crisis experience with exuberant
banking in some countries, but not in others, and the resulting banking fragility during the
crisis and its cross-country implications, further underline the need for more centralisation
of banking policies at the EU level.
This article has reviewed the December 2012 draft regulation for the first element of the
banking union, the establishment of a Single Supervisory Mechanism, from the point of
view of non-euro area countries. While the treaty base provides a relatively narrow basis
for the involvement of non-euro area countries, the achieved compromise provides strong
safeguards to protect the interests of non-euro area countries:
• They will have the same voice as euro-area member states in the ECB supervisory
board;
• Theywill have the right to exit and therefore exempt themselves from a supervisory
decision;
• With regard to its supervisory tasks, the ECB will be accountable to the European
Parliament and the Council of Ministers (i.e. EU institutions);
• The supervisory board will report regularly to the Eurogroup, extended to include
the ministers of non-euro participating member states;
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• The ECB will have to answer in writing questions from national parliaments, and
members of the supervisory board can be invited by national parliaments;
• The draft regulation requires the ECB to pay as much attention to financial stability
in each member state as to the financial stability of the EU, and while the focus of
the SSMwill be on large banks, the ECBwill have the right to exercise supervisory
power with respect to small banks as well if they are suspected to posing a threat
to financial stability. Moreover, the ECB has overall responsibility for the SSM;
• Macroprudential tools will remain in the hands of national authorities of partici-
pating member states.
On its own, the SSM would not bring the full benefits of a banking union, but it could
deliver a number of advantages:
• Fostering financial integration with associated benefits;
• Improving the supervision of cross-border banks;
• Possibly improving the quality of banking oversight;
• Ensuring greater consistency of supervisory practices;
• Avoiding eventual competitive distortions;
• Providing supervisory information on all financial institutions participating in the
SSM.
For different countries outside the euro area, different aspects could be more valuable. For
example, for Denmark, a country that hosts only few subsidiaries and branches of foreign
banks, but inwhich banking supervision is thought to be one of the strictest, themain benefit
could be greater consistency of supervisory practices and the avoidance of competitive
distortions. According to some stakeholders, certain Danish and Swedish supervisory
practices are rather different, putting Danish banks at a competitive disadvantage relative
to Swedish banks. Therefore joint Danish/Swedish participation in the SSM could level the
playing field. Denmark would also benefit from the improved supervision of cross-border
banks, because the biggest Danish bank, Danske Bank, has a major subsidiary in Finland.
In addition, SSM participation will be a precondition for participation in the Single
Resolution Mechanism, once agreed. Currently, the strict bail-in clause of the Danish
bank resolution legislation has led to a downgrade of Danish banks by two notches
and a corresponding increase in bank borrowing costs, a development acknowledged by
Danish central bank Governor Lars Rohde in his speech at the parliamentary hearing for
which this article was originally prepared (Bloomberg, 2013a; see also slide 5 of Danske
Bank, 2012). While the SRM will also likely have important elements of bail-in and other
possibilities to impose losses on bank creditors, this would apply to all members of the
SRM and thereby prevent competitive distortions19.
In CEE countries, where the banking system is dominated by foreign banks, fostering
financial integration, getting supervisory information on parent banks and improving
the supervision of cross-border banking groups could also be of major relevance. Also,
19 ForDenmark, the incorporation of tough bail-in rules in the SRM (similar to the current Danish bank resolution
legislation) will be essential (see Bloomberg, 2013b and 2013c).
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a number of CEE countries went through unsustainable credit booms before the crisis,
mostly accompanied by foreign currency lending, which has had major repercussions.
Addressing national credit booms through national supervisory action only is difficult,
since banks can exploit supervisory arbitrage. A single supervisory mechanism is more
suitable for addressing such credit booms. The SSM will also be able to address more
easily previous possibilities of regulatory arbitrage in which banks could turn subsidiaries
into branches and vice versa to benefit from different regulatory requirements.
Making a decision on joining the SSM ismademore difficult by the uncertainty concerning
the design of other elements of the banking union. At the same time, little is known at the
moment about the eventual burden-sharing element of the banking union. Stakeholders in
some countries fear that their taxpayers will have to bail out foreign banks, while others
fear that an eventual lack of a proper burden-sharing agreement would not break the
vicious circle between banks and sovereigns, and therefore the full benefits of the banking
union cannot be attained. In particular, lack of ESM participation of non-euro area member
states that joined the banking union is a major concern. Yet we see no reason why the
ESM Treaty could not be changed later to include non-euro area members of the banking
union (only for the banking resolution task of the ESM, not for the lending to euro-area
sovereigns task). Also, if the fiscal backstop will be organised differently from the ESM,
non-euro area members could be included on equal footing with euro-area members.
We agree that the full benefits of the banking union can be achieved only with a coherent
system that also involves some burden sharing togetherwith very stringent resolution tools.
However, improved supervision and consistent resolution among participating member
states should reduce the probability of the need for cross-border burden sharing. And even
if such a proper agreement on burden sharing is not on the horizon at the moment, the SSM
in itself would bring a number of benefits for all EU countries outside the euro area and
the main contours of the SRM will also be revealed in the coming months. We therefore
conclude that non-euro area countries should stand ready to join the SSM and should be
prepared for constructive negotiations on the SRM.
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Appendix: SSM coverage of non-euro area EU member states20
We use the extensive but not comprehensive The Banker database to estimate the percent
of total banking assets covered by the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) in non-euro
area member states, should they decide to join. This database includes 1,097 bank holding
companies and subsidiaries out of the 9,076 monetary and financial institutions standing
in the EU at the end of 2012.21 Since the institutions not included are small, the database
has a good coverage of the total banking assets in the EU, varying between 71 percent and
100 percent (Table 4).
Table 4: Coverage of The Banker Database of total assets in the national financial system
Total consolidated assets (e millions, end of 2012)
Country The Banker ECB Coverage
Bulgaria 38,884 40,604 96%
Czech Republic 152,388 175,276 87%
Denmark 889,069 932,590 95%
Hungary 96,810 110,986 87%
Latvia 25,076 27,019 93%
Lithuania 22,779 22,855 100%
Poland 268,833 318,368 84%
Romania 75,072 84,094 89%
Sweden 1,497,254 1,647,740 91%
UK 8,080,806 11,353,739 71%
Sources: ECB and The banker Database. Note: Data from the Danker Database relates to end 2012,
while the ECB consolidated balance sheet data is for June 2012.
A drawback of this dataset is that it reports the total assets of the whole banking group for
the headquarters, and not just the assets from activities in the country of the headquarters.
This matters for countries in which there are headquarters of banks with cross-border
activities, like the UK, Sweden and Denmark, but also for Hungary. Unfortunately, we
could not separate the non-domestic assets from The Banker database. In our calculations,
we relate the euro amount of assets of financial institutions to be covered by the SSM
from The Banker database to total assets from the ECB. Luckily, the European Central
Bank has an aggregate balance sheet data that has exactly the same coverage: “Domestic
banking groups and stand alone banks, foreign (EU and non-EU) controlled subsidiaries
and foreign (EU and non-EU) controlled branches”. We therefore used this aggregate,
which is consistent with The Banker database, though this does not include only domestic
assets.
Another drawback of the dataset is that it does not include most branches, some larger
branches are erroneously counted as subsidiaries, and it misses some small subsidiaries
as well. Therefore, our estimates for the percent coverage by the SSM in the case of
participation presented in Figure 1 of the main text and Figure 3 should be taken as the
20 This appendix was prepared by Carlos de Sousa.
21 The 1,097 data is from the The Banker database, the 9,076 figures is from the European Central Bank:
http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2013/html/pr130121.en.html.
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minimum share of total assets that would be under the SSM if all non-euro area member
states would decide to join.
From the Regulation, we used the following criteria to assess whether a financial institution
will fall under the supervision of the ECB:
i. The total value of its assets exceeds e30 billion; or,
ii. The ratio of its total assets over the GDP of the participating member state of
establishment exceeds 20 percent, unless the total value of its assets is below
e5 billion; or,
iii. It is among the three most significant credit institutions in the participatingmember
state, unless justified by particular circumstances; or,
iv. It is subsidiary or branch of a banking group headquartered in a euro-area country;
or,
v. It is subsidiary or branch of a banking group headquartered in a non-euro area EU
country.
Non-euro area EU countries may join the SSM and therefore we introduced criterion (v)
as well.
Note that other institutions that are concluded to have a significant relevance with regard to
the domestic economy, and institutions in which cross-border assets or liabilities represent
a significant part of total assets,will also be covered by the SMM,butwe did not incorporate
these considerations. Also, all institutions for which public financial assistance has been
requested or received directly from the EFSF or the ESM will be covered by the SSM,
but such direct support has not yet been granted and, according to current legislation,
non-euro area countries cannot benefit from the European Financial Stability Facility and
European Stability Mechanism.
Figure 1 in the main text presents our results for the total coverage in case of all EU
countries join the SSM, while Figure 3 decomposes the data of Figure 1 according to the
roles of the different criteria detailed above.
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Figure 3: Percent of assets falling under the SSM in the case of participation and the percent
of assets of EU banks subsidiaries: detailed results
Sources: The Banker Database, ECB and Bruegel calculations
Note: This figure details the composition of the totals shown on Figure 1 of the main text. The left
column for each country shows the coverage in the SSM (the criteria are detailed in this Appendix),
while the right column shows the share of subsidiaries (and distinguishes between euro-area and
other EU subsidiaries). Numbers over the bars indicate the number of banks that fall into each
category. In the UK, there would be three banks under criteria iv and one additional bank if all
non-euro area member states join, but their share is so small that it cannot be seen in the figure.
In order to check the precision of our estimates from The Banker database in the case of
a particular country, we compared our results with the comprehensive dataset of the Hun-
garian Financial Supervisory Authority which includes all financial institutions, including
branches (Table 5).
Table 5: Comparison of our estimates from The Banker database with the official data
(Million euro; end-2012) Hungarian FinancialSupervisory Authority
The Banker
database
The Banker database
combined with ECB
data on total assets
Total assets 118,297 96,810 110,986
Assets under SSM 91,690 87,853 87,853
Total number of institutions 435 23 23
Number of institutions under SSM 54 15 15
Share of Assets under the SSM 78% 91% 79%
Source of the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority data:
https://www.pszaf.hu/bal menu/jelentesek statisztikak/statisztikak/aranykonyv (in Hungarian)
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The two main reasons for the difference are that The Banker Database does not include (a)
most of the branches and (b) smaller banks. As Table 5 shows, in the case of Hungary, the
difference in assets under the SSM is not large and when we use total assets from the ECB
and relate to it the assets to be covered from The Banker Database, the difference in the
estimated share of assets to be covered by the SSM is small (78 percent versus 79 percent).
For consistency with the data of other countries, in Figures 1 and 3 for Hungary we also
use the euro value of the assets to be covered from The Banker database and total assets
from the ECB.
